Western public opinion frequently voices uncritical applause for the economic reforms in the People's Republic of China. The expectation of large sales opportunities in the Chinese market has led to a kind of China-euphoria in certain business circles. This frequently overlooks the fact that there are a wide variety of problems in implementing the reforms, which still have to be truly put to the test.
I
n recent years the People's Republic of China has been the scene of economic and social reforms conducted both on a scale and at a pace hitherto unknown in socialist countries. The following are cited as essential characteristics of the reforms: the realisation of a specifically Chinese form of socialism, i.e. one which is pragmatic and largely de-ideologised; a clearer separation between political power and economic management; replacement of the economic system based on central directives by a system of statedetermined "economic levers"; the move towards decentralising economic decision-making authority and strengthening self-responsibility at the level of individual enterprises; encouragement of cooperative and private ownership, especially in the agricultural sector, in craft trades, wholesaling and retailing, and in the service industries; making the Chinese economy a more open one in relation to the rest of the world. The final result, as the Chinese themselves see it, to emerge from the reforms is to be a "socialist market economy under the umbrella of central strategic planning".
Because of the rapid pace of reform and the large number of special regulations, it has by now become increasingly difficult even for professional observers of the Chinese scene to keep up with, let alone assess, the reform process in its full breadth, depth, effects and results. And this occurs at a time when Peking's economic reforms are receiving largely uncritical applause in the West. The successes reported in the press, which in China too is manipulated, are regarded as confirmation that the chosen path is indeed the right one. The large sales opportunities expected in the Chinese market have led to a kind of China-euphoria in certain business circles.
* University of Gie8en. -142 However, this often overlooks the fact that the declarations of intent made by the reformers have yet to be converted into economic reality, and that there are a great number of difficulties in implementing the reforms. The reforms have yet to be truly put to the test. This will not happen, until more complex tasks such as the reform of the price system have to be tackled and implemented. Furthermore, it will only become apparent in the long term whether the new incentives and control elements will produce the desired results, or whether they may not set in motion developments -in the social sphere, perhaps -which tear apart the framework set by the Party. Economic liberalisation could for instance, if it is to be successful, also produce a need for moves towards political liberalisation. The latter, however, are likely rapidly to run up against barriers determined, among other things, by the principles of maintaining the system and the power of the Party.
Peking's reformers do appear to be aware of both present and potential future difficulties in carrying out their economic policy. These difficulties can be located primarily in the following problem areas: 
Tension between Planning and Market
In the long term, the success or failure of economic reform in China will depend on whether the authorities can manage to introduce market elements into the planned economy and allow both of these coordinating factors to work efficiently. Both proponents of a properly functioning market economy and those advocating the traditional dirigistic planned economy doubt that this will be possible. Each group regards the plan and the market as irreconcilable bed-fellows. The "central plan" camp is convinced that spontaneous market activities will, at the very least, hinder the production and supply activities foreseen in the central plan. The "market economy" camp, observing the sheer number of state interferences in productive and distributive processes and their lack of economic rationality, comes to the conclusion that these distort market information so strongly that even activities that are coordinated via the market will ultimately be inefficient.
In fact, problems of this nature are part of everyday economic life in China. There are still, for instance, raw materials and capital goods which are distributed almost exclusively according to state plans; this means that they can hardly be legally obtained on the "free" market. At the same time, however, "unplanned" orders placed by individual enterprises create such an intense demand for goods of this kind, and such premium prices may be paid under certain circumstances, that the materials are in short supply, or lacking altogether, for centrally planned projects. In this case, the market crowds out the plan. An interesting aspect of this is that such spontaneous demand frequently emanates from regional authorities, especially municipalities, using this as a means of realising their own development plans.
As Peking's plans, already carried out in part, to grant greater political, financial and economic autonomy to regional public authorities begin to gather way, the competition for scare resources can be expected to increase still further. Financially strong and efficient regional administrations such as that of Shanghai or the authorities of the special economic zones are likely to be in quite a favourable situation under such "competitive" conditions. On the other hand the liberalised laws on external trade give these authorities the chance to import materials they have difficulty in obtaining domestically.
INTERECONOMICS, May/June 1986
The Chinese economic reformers are clearly aware nowadays that it is impossible to plan centrally each and every economic activity, and to enforce such activities exclusively by administrative means. Their new scheme of things, therefore, is that the central organs should now only be charged with production decisions where a broad perspective is needed, and where broad economic structures need to be determined, examples being the exploitation of new resources, the direction of technology policy, regional development and key projects in the energy and transport sectors. Routine production decisions, on the other hand, should be increasingly left to the expert knowledge of the individual enterprise. In as far as state involvement does become necessary, it should take the form not of directives but of the use of "economic levers" in combination with modernised legal regulations applying to economic activity. In the official conception these economic levers include, in particular, prices, taxes and availability of loans, together with wages and incomes policy.
Direct Control versus Indicative Market Regulation
In general terms, one can say that the path now embarked on by the Chinese reforms is a sensible one. In Western market economies, too, such aspects as transport and energy policy, the promotion of technology, and regional policy are all areas where the state exerts an influence. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to overlook a number of substantial differences.
For example, whereas government promotion of technology in West Germany only occurs in selected areas in the form of programmes initiated by nongovernment bodies or enterprises, technical progress in the China of today is still largely centrally planned and directed, as is particularly clearly apparent in the field of technology imports. A consequence of this is that individual enterprises lack the initiative to carry out technical innovation of their own.
It is also worthy of note that Chinese government structural and development policy also encompasses areas where there is no recognisable need for economic policy action. In such cases there is a danger that market coordination, which would otherwise be possible, is partly or totally rendered inoperable. Here are a few examples of what can happen:
A number of the most important raw materials and capital goods are still produced and distributed to their users according to central plans. Political considerations predominate over economic criteria of
